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superior to those of the assignee. The Court did not address the question of whether such rights would be superior to those of a purchaser
for fair consideration. In all likelihood, the equitable approach would
conversely require that the rights of the judgment creditor be subordinated to those of such a purchaser. 200 Although its decision might be
criticized for misreading, if not ignoring, legislative intent, there can be
little doubt that the Court achieved results which were not only fair,
but also commendable since the vitality of an otherwise "impotent
remedy" 201 was restored.
INsuRANcE LAW

Ins. Law §§ 670-77: 90-day notice held "as soon as practicable" under
no-fault.
When the New York Legislature instituted no-fault insurance by
enacting the Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, 202
commentators criticized the concept on both constitutional and equitable grounds.2 13 Recently these views found support in a Supreme
Court, Kings County, decision declaring the no-fault act unconstitutional. 204 Few critics, however, have anticipated the manifold procedural
problems arising in the day-to-day operation of the Act. 20 5
200An analogy may be made to CPLR 5202(a) which provides that a judgment
creditor who has delivered an execution to the sheriff has rights superior to those of a
transferee who received the property for less than fair consideration. A purchaser for
fair consideration, however, is expressly not affected by these rights. CPLR 5202(a)(1).
See 6 WKL-M
5202.19, 5202.21.
201 In re Nassau Expressway, 56 Misc. 2d 602, 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1968). Under prior decisions, CPLR 5222(b) was held to no longer afford
judgment creditors priorities formerly enjoyed under the CPA. See, e.g., City of New
York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 163, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (1st Dep't 1965).
Of course, a contempt action against the wrongful judgment debtor has always been
available. CPLR 5251. Concededly, were the judgment creditor to show in the contempt
proceeding that the misconduct of the judgment debtor was responsible for an actual
loss, the court could impose a fine sufficient to reimburse him. In re Nassau Expressway,
56 Misc. 2d 602, 604, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968). The likelihood of collecting this sum from a person who had previously divested himself of all
assets, however, would be remote. See id. at 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684. On the other hand,
if the judgment creditor were to fail to sustain this burden of proving actual loss, the
imposed fine could not exceed the costs incurred by him in bringing the motion for
contempt. McDonnell v. Frawley, 23 App. Div. 2d 729, 257 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1st Dep't
1965).
202 N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
203 See, e.g., Note, No-Fault Insurance in New York: Another Hazard for the Innocent Driver, 40 B'KLsYN L. Rav. 689 (1974). The New York no-fault plan is described as
a "palpably unfair, inadequate, and inherently unconstitutional compromise which will
not only fail to correct the defects of the present system, but is likely to compound them."
Id. See also Comment, New York Adopts No Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALBANY
L. R v. 662, 710-15 (1973).
204 Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1975).
205 See Schwartz, No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of Threshold Questions Under the
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In what appears to be a case of first impression, Subia v. Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Co., 20 6 the Supreme Court, Queens County,
faced the issue of whether the notice requirements held to govern the
fault-type insurance system should be applied to the new coverage.
Departing from the more stringent construction courts have given the
notice requirements of the pre-no-fault system, the court held that
notice filed 90 days after an accident occurred was given "as soon as
20 7
reasonably practicable."
The plaintiff in Subia was involved in a motor vehicle accident
on February 28, 1974. The injuries she sustained caused her to be hospitalized from March 6 to March 17. Her attorney mailed a no-fault
claim form to her insurance company on April 8.208 On July 5, defendant disclaimed any liability under the policy, alleging that plaintiff
had failed to give reasonable notice of the accident. Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment establishing her right
to receive first-party benefits.
Virtually every liability insurance policy contains a provision which
requires that notice of an occurrence be given the insurer "as soon as
practicable." 20 9 Compliance with this clause is a condition precedent
to the insurer's obligation to idemnify the insured.210 The same language is also utilized in no-fault policies to indicate the time in which
211
proof of claim must be sent to the insurer.
It has been stated that " 'as soon as practicable' are 'roomy words
cases'...." 212
... subject to the impact of particular facts on particular
Accordingly, if a claimant offered an excuse to explain his or her delay
in filing a notice of accident, a jury would usually be called upon to
Neglected Procedural Dimension, 41 B'xLYN L. REv. 37 (1974),
New York Statute-The
which forecast "[a]n array of practical problems inevitable in day-to-day operation of
no-fault .... " Id. at 41.
206 80 Misc. 2d 1090, 364 N.YS.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975).
207 Id. at 1097, 364 N.YS.2d at 125.
208 Although the claim form was postmarked April 10, defendant insurance company
contended that it did not receive the claim form until April 15. Id. at 1092, 864 N.YS.2d
at 120.

209A typical example is the Allstate Insurance Company provision which states:

"In the event of accident, occurrence or loss, written notice containing all particulars
shall be given by or for the insured to Allstate as soon as practicable." Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Manger, 30 Misc. 2d 326, 328, 213 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961). This
notice provision and the one in Subia are in accordance with the requirements of the
New York Code of Rules and Regulations. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65.2 (1961).
210 See Lloyd v. MVAIC, 27 App. Div. 2d 396, 279 N.YS.2d 593 (1st Dep't 1967) (per

curiam).
211 See 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65.2 (1961).
212 Deso v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 132, 143 N.E2d 889, 892,
164 N.YS.2d 689, 694 (1957) (Desmond, J., dissenting), quoting Young v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
119 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1941).
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determine the reasonableness of the notice in light of the relevant
facts. 213 Absent such an excuse, however, it is well established that the
court must decide as a matter of law if the notice was given as soon as
214
practicable.
In Subia, Justice Wallach determined that plaintiff had failed to
create an inference of excuse sufficient to warrant that the matter be
sent to a jury to determine the reasonableness of the notice.2 15 Since
precedents involving other types of insurance coverage had already
established the time period under consideration to be unreasonable
as a matter of law,216 general principles of insurance law would have
compelled the court to deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.2 ' 7
Justice Wallach's obvious reluctance to take this course forced him to
fashion a novel solution; he concluded that no-fault insurance was
sufficiently different from other types of insurance to justify the em218
ployment of "new principles of construction."
Justice Wallach compared the notice requirement of the no-fault
policy amendment with the uninsured motorist endorsement provisions219 and the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation
213 See, e.g., Deso v. London 8- Lancashire Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 129-30, 143
N.E.2d 889, 890, 164 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (1957); Clute v. Harder Silo Co., 42 App. Div. 2d
818, 819, 345 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (4th Dep't 1973) (mem.); Bonavita v. Enright, 30 App. Div.
2d 1027, 1028, 294 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294 (3d Dep't 1968). The excuses which the court will find
sufficient to send the issue to the jury are rather limited. See Deso v. London & Lancashire
Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 129, 143 N.E2d 889, 890, 164 N.YS.2d 689, 691 (1957) (lack of
knowledge of the occurrence or absence from the state) (dictum); Scala v. Scala, 19 App.
Div. 2d 559, 560, 241 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.) (justifiable lack of knowledge
of coverage) (dictum); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 138, 147, 209 N.YS.2d
104, 113 (2d Dep't 1960) (justifiable lack of knowledge of coverage) (dictum).
214 See Greenwich Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 250 N.Y. 116, 164 N.E. 876 (1928),
where the Court of Appeals stated that "a reasonable time, when the facts are undisputed
and different inferences cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts, is a question of law."
Id. at 131, 164 N.E. at 81.
215 80 Misc. 2d at 1093, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
216In Subia, defendant was not notified of the accident until 45 days had passed.
Had previous holdings involving fault coverage been followed, this time period would
have been deemed unreasonable. See Deso v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d
127, 130, 143 N.E.2d 889, 891, 164 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (1957) (an unexcused delay of 51 days
held violative of the notice condition of the policy); Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.,
251 N.Y. 302, 804, 167 N.E. 450, 451 (1929) (22-day delay held not "immediate as required
by the policy'); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 138, 146-47, 209 N.Y.S2d 104,
112-13 (2d Dep't 1960) (unexcused 30-day delay deemed unreasonable as a matter of law).
217justice Wallach conceded this fact. 80 Misc. 2d at 1093, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
218 Id.
219 N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a) (McKinney 1966) requires automobile liability policies to
contain an "uninsured motorist" endorsement wherein:
the insurer agrees that it will pay to the insured... the maximum amount ...
of twenty thousand dollars ... on account of injury to ... more than one person
in any one accident, which the insured ... shall be entitled to recover as damages
from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, unidentified motor vehicle which leaves the scene of the accident, a motor vehicle ... as to which ...
there was not in effect a policy of liability insurance ... an insured motor vehicle
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sections 220 of the Insurance Law. The latter coverages afford a claimant
at least 90 days to give notice of claim. The analogy fails, however, since
these coverages often only reimburse the claimant after it has been
established that the other vehicle is uninsured.221 Frequently the claimant under these provisions does not ascertain the lack of insurance or
that an insurer has disclaimed liability until some time has passed. 2
His situation, therefore, would require a longer notice period. In a
no-fault setting, where the insured need only notify his own carrier,
without regard to the other party's coverage, there is no equivalent
reason for granting such additional time. Indeed, the comparison leads
to the conclusion that less time should be permitted a no-fault claimant.
Moreover, the court appears to have confused the proof of claim
requirement with the separate and distinct requirement for notice of
the accident. The purpose of the latter is to inform the insurance company that there was an occurrence which may result in a claim. The
proof of claim particularizes the injuries and resultant medical bills for
which the insured is seeking reimbursement. 223 In Subia, the first
notice of the accident that the insurance company received was the
proof of claim. It is significant to note that the company did not protest
where the insurer disclaims liability or an unregistered vehicle because of bodily
injury .... including death .. .. , sustained by the insured ....
Id.

220 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 600-626 (McKinney 1966), as amended (Supp. 1974). The Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) was created to provide compensation for uninsured victims of motor vehicle accidents who are injured by automobiles
which, inter alia, are uninsured or unidentified. Id. § 600. Every, insurer authorized to
write automobile liability insurance in New York is required to become a member of
MVAIC. Id. § 602.
The Subia court compared a no-fault claimant to MVAIC's "qualified person," i.e.
"a resident of this state, other than an insured or the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle
and his spouse when a passenger in such vehicle ...." Id. § 601(b)(1) (McKinney Supp.
1974). The court's analogy seems especially strained since the no-fault claimant seeks
reimbursement ultimately from his own insurance carrier, whereas the MVAIC claimant
himself is uninsured.
221 See Portnoy v. MVAIC, 40 App. Div. 2d 598, 335 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Ist Dep't 1972)
(per curiam) (burden on MVAIC claimant to establish that automobile involved in accident was uninsured). As a condition precedent to claiming under the "uninsured motorist"
endorsement, it must be established that the other vehicle is uninsured, or that it is
unidentified and left the scene of the accident, or that it is insured but liability had been
disclaimed. N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(2-a) (McKinney 1966).
222 A claimant must show, however, that he has been diligent in attempting to determine if there was insurance and has promptly given notice once a lack of coverage is
ascertained. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anziano, 59 Misc. 2d 673, 675-76, 300 N.Y.S.2d 187,
190-91 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
223 An insurer is authorized to request "full particulars of the nature and extent of
the injuries and treatment received and contemplated." 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65.2 (1961). The
insurer may also demand that the injured party (or someone on his behalf) "provide any
other pertinent information that may assist the Company in determining the amount due
and payable." Id.
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the lateness of the claim, but rather plaintiff's unreasonable, unexcused
delay in informing the company of the accident's occurrence.2 24 Yet,
as support for a more liberal construction of the "as soon as practicable" requirement in no-fault policies, Justice Wallach raised the argument that "many laymen would not think of making a claim until they
had either received the medical bills or until they knew the extent of
their injuries." 2 s
Generally, an insurance company requires notice of accident as
soon as practicable for several compelling reasons.226 Obviously, the
sooner an investigation is begun, the easier it is to ascertain the identity
of witnesses. Further, an examination of the accident site can disclose
the presence of skid marks, road conditions, and debris which may have
contributed to the occurrence or help explain it.227 In his eagerness to
distinguish no-fault from other insurance situations, Justice Wallach
maintained that, because there is no finding of fault involved, an insurance company's needs for immediate investigation of a no-fault claim
are eliminated. 228 He overlooked, however, the continuing possibility
that the insurer will be required to defend a common law negligence
action. For example, if another party injured in the accident with the
insured incurred necessary medical expenses in excess of $500, he would
be deemed to have suffered a "serious injury" 229 for which a common
law claim may be brought.230
Prompt notice of the occurrence of an accident will also help ensure that the injuries set forth in the subsequent proof of claim in fact
resulted from the accident. While in most instances first-party benefits
under no-fault will be paid without dispute,231 problems can be more
224 80 Misc. 2d at 1092, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
225 Id. at 1095, 364 N.YS.2d at 123 (emphasis added).
226 See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anziano, 59 Misc. 2d 673, 300 N.YS.2d 187 (Sup.

Ct. Nassau County 1969), wherein the court explained that the purpose of a notice requirement is to "permit the insurer to investigate ... while claims are fresh and memories
have not faded ...
.'Id. at 676, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
227 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manger, 30 Misc. 2d 326, 329, 213 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905-06
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961).
228 80 Misc. 2d at 1096, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
229 N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). An injury is serious

if the reasonable and customary charges for medical, hospital, surgical, nursing,
dental, ambulance, x-ray, prescription drug and prosthetic services necessarily
performed as a result of the injury would exceed five hundred dollars.
Id.
230 Under the no-fault insurance plan, there is no right of recovery for any noneconomic loss unless there is a serious injury. Id. § 673(l). Thus, a no-fault claimant receives
no compensation for pain and suffering. Once the $500 threshold is reached, however, an

injured party may institute a common law claim which may include pain and suffering. Id.
231See 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65.6(a) (1961). To encourage prompt payment, the no-fault act
mandates that reimbursement of first-party benefits be made as soon as a loss has been
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easily resolved by prompt notice and investigation. Thus, an early
notice of accident provision would further, not hinder, the purpose
28 2
of no-fault, viz, to reimburse injured claimants.
By establishing as a matter of law that 90 days' notice is reasonable
in the no-fault area, it appears that Justice Wallach is rewriting the provisions of the contract between the parties. In light of well-established
principles of insurance law, the Subia court should have denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. It is suggested that the court overstepped the bounds of its judicial function in selecting this forum for
expressing its displeasure with the no-fault notice provisions.
DOLE v. Dow CHEMICAL CO.

Dole counterclaim unavailable against plaintiff suing in representative
capacity.
The CPLR states that "[a] counterclaim may be any cause of action
in favor of one or more defendants ...against one or more plaintiffs,
[or] a person whom a plaintiff represents .... " 233 While the statute's
broad language may appear to permit unrestricted claims back and forth
between the parties regardless of the capacity in which a party appears
in the action, it is an established rule in New York civil procedure that
a defendant's counterclaim against a plaintiff is "restricted to the capacity in which [the plaintiff] sues. ' 234 The purpose of this rule is to
"preclude an unwarranted mixture of a person's individual and representative liabilities and assets through the confusing use of counterclaims in litigation." 235
It is not surprising, therefore, that in Grierson v. Wagar236 the
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, granted a motion to dismiss a
counterclaim against plaintiff in her individual capacity when plaintiff
had sued as executrix. The action which arose out of an automobile
accident with the defendant was brought by plaintiff to recover damages
incurred. A claimant is entitled to recover interest at 2% per month on all payments not
made within 30 days of the loss. N.Y. INS. LAw § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
232 See Governor's Memorandum of Feb. 13, 1973, Approval of Bills, Comprehensive
Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, in McKINNEY's SESSiON LAws oF Nav Yoan 2335
(1973). See also Comment, New York Adopts No Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37
ALBANY L. Rnv. 662, 671 (1973), wherein it is stated that "the [no-fault] Act was primarily
intended to compensate motor vehicle accident victims quickly for substantially all of
their economic loss."
233 CPLR 3019(a).
234 Ehrlich v. American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 259, 257
N.E.2d 890, 892, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1970) (counterclaim against plaintiff as representative of estate not allowed when plaintiff sued in individual capacity); 7B McKmNsa's
CPLR 3019, commentary at 217-18 (1974). See 3 WK&M T 3019.08.
235 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 218 (1974).
236 78 Misc. 2d 479, 357 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1974).

